Multiparty key agreement protocols by Pieprzyk, J. & Li, C. H.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Informatics - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences 
July 2000 
Multiparty key agreement protocols 
J. Pieprzyk 
University of Wollongong 
C. H. Li 
University of Wollongong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers 
 Part of the Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pieprzyk, J. and Li, C. H.: Multiparty key agreement protocols 2000. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/177 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Multiparty key agreement protocols 
Abstract 
A class of multiparty key agreement protocols based on secret sharing is presented. The trust 
infrastructure necessary to achieve the intended security goals is discussed. 
Disciplines 
Physical Sciences and Mathematics 
Publication Details 
This paper originally appeared as: Pieprzyk, J and Li, CH, Multiparty key agreement protocols, IEE 
Proceedings - Computers and Digital Techniques, July 2000, 147(4), 229-236. Copyright IEEE 2000. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/177 
Multiparty key agreement protocols 
J.Pieprzyk and C.-H.Li 
Abstract: A class of multiparty key agreement protocols based on secret sharing is presented. The 
trust infrastructure necessary to achieve the intended security goals is discussed. Entity 
authentication is suggested to be replaced by a less expensive group authentication. Two key 
agreement protocols are discussed. The first is the group key agreement where all principals must 
be active to call the conference. The other allows a big enough subgroup (controlled by the 
threshold parameter t)  to trigger the conference. It is proved that the protocols achieve key 
freshness, key confidentiality, group authentication and key confirmation. A discussion about 
possible modifications and extensions of the protocol concludes the paper. 
1 Introduction 
Most cryptographic tools can only be used if appropriate 
cryptographic keys are known to the parties. The intrinsic 
difficulty of key establishment in large computer networks 
has led to the invention of public-key cryptography where 
one of the keys can be made public, considerably simplify- 
ing the problem of key establishment. There are two well 
known categories of key establishment protocols: key 
transport and key agreement. Key transport protocols 
enable two communicating parties to obtain a common 
secret key by using pre-established secure communication 
channels between them and a trusted third party (TTP). 
Normally, the TTP is responsible for the generation of a 
fresh secret key and the parties gratefully accept it. 
Key agreement protocols, on the other hand, allow the 
parties to interact with each other so that, they can derive a 
common secret key. Moreover, they exercise equal influ- 
ence on the final form of the secret. Although the TTP is 
not directly involved in the protocol, its existence is crucial 
as it provides the public keys of the parties, typically, in the 
form of proper certificates (or public keys signed by the 
TTP). The TTP has no access to the secret agreed between 
the parties. That is why, in some applications, key agree- 
ment is preferred to key transport. 
A natural evolution of cryptography has given rise to the 
so-called multiparty cryptography (also termed group or 
society oriented) with a key establishment protocol as its 
integral part. Traditionally, the multiparty key establish- 
ment is also called conference key establishment. 
The very first key transport protocol was published by 
Needham and Schroeder [ l ]  in 1978. There are three 
players in it: two principals and a TTP. The principals 
share secure channels with the TTP and the channels are 
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used in the protocol to distribute the secret fresh key 
generated by the TTP. It turned out that even this relatively 
modest protocol goal was not attainable in the protocol. If a 
transcript of the communications together with the secret 
key is lost and is then found by an attacker, then the 
attacker may pretend to be one of the parties and the other 
principal has no way to tell apart messages generated in the 
past from the present ones. In other words, the key 
freshness is not guaranteed. 
Public key cryptography was invented by Diffie and 
Hellman [2]. The validity of the concept was illustrated on 
an example showing how two principals may agree on a 
secret key via a public negotiation. This is a classical key 
agreement protocol. Unfortunately, the main weakness of it 
was the lack of principals’ authentication : they can 
establish a secret key but they do not know with whom. 
This is to say that the protocol is subject to the man-in-the- 
middle attack. Diffie, et al. [3] modified the original 
Diffie-Hellman protocol in which both principals are 
able to authenticate each other. To implement it, a TTP 
must provide authentic parameters of the principals. 
The experience with key establishment protocols illus- 
trates, sometimes very dramatically, that the design of 
‘secure’ protocols is not easy. The main difficulty seems 
to be a very vague definition of what we expect from secure 
protocols. The expected security characteristics of the 
protocol are called security goals. The security goals 
must be defined well before the construction of the proto- 
col. There is a generic collection of security goals which 
typically includes key freshness, key confidentiality, prh-  
cipal authentication and key confirmation. 
Multiparty key establishment can be seen as a general- 
isation of two-party key establishment. The first multiparty 
key agreement was published by Ingemarsson et al. [4] 
which is a generalisation of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. 
Fiat and Naor [5] considered key agreement in the context 
of broadcast encryption where the messages are to be 
decrypted by groups. Burmester and Desmedt [6]  showed 
that if the group is able to structure itself into a ring, then 
after two broadcasts per principal, the group is able to 
derive a common secret key. Just and Vaudenay [7] showed 
that the Burmester-Desmedt protocol fails to provide 
entity authentication and suggested a protocol in which 
two-party authentication is extended into the group authen- 
tication. 
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2 Multiparty cryptography 
Secret sharing has become an indispensable cryptographic 
tool whenever the control over execution of a cryptographic 
operation is assigned to a group rather than to an individual. 
Blakley [8] and Shamir [9] considered a key management 
system in which the secret is collectively held by a group of 
n principals allowing any t of them to recover the secret 
( t  5 n). The access structure of the secret sharing deter- 
mines the collection of all subsets of principals who are 
authorised to recover the secret. One of the simplest access 
structure is a (t, n) threshold scheme when any collection of 
t or more principals are authorised to recover the secret. 
Secret sharing is set up by an algorithm called the dealer. 
It has to be run by a trusted party. For a given secret, it 
produces shares of the secret and distributes them to 
principals via secure channels. To recover the secret, a 
currently active subset of shareholders pools the shares and 
recovers the secret if it belongs to the access structure, 
otherwise it fails with an overwhelming probability. The 
recovery of the secret is typically implemented as the 
combiner algorithm. It can be run collectively or by a 
trusted party (for example one of the active principals who 
is trusted by others). After secret recovery, the combiner 
distributes the secret via secure channels to all active 
principals. A good tutorial on secret sharing and the 
vocabulary used can be found in [lo]. 
Secret sharing allows groups to define (via its access 
structure) who is authorised to recover the secret. If a 
cryptographic operation is activated by a proper secret key, 
then to allow a group control over it, it is enough to give 
shares of the secret using a secret sharing scheme with a 
properly defined access structure. It should be no surprise 
that secret sharing should be of great help in designing 
conference key establishment protocols. Some of attractive 
features of secret sharing are listed below. 
(1) Access structure gives a convenient way to differentiate 
principals and their power within the group. This could reflect 
the amount oftrust assigned to each principal or perhaps, the 
place of the principal in the organisation. If all principals are 
equally trusted, or perhaps we are dealing with a democratic 
organisation, then a threshold scheme is appropriate. 
(2) Delegation is possible if a principal who holds her 
share passes permanently or temporarily her share to a 
delegated person or a group of people. 
(3) Secret sharing used can reflect the formal parameters 
of a conference, indicating how large a subset of active 
principals has to be to call the conference. Again, if the 
threshold secret sharing is acceptable, then the selection of 
the threshold enables one to manipulate the size of the 
group that is able to call on the conference. 
(4) Secret sharing can be immunised against the loss of 
shares by making it proactive with a share refreshment 
protocol [I 11. 
(5) Group authentication can replace principal authentica- 
tion. Group authentication is a weaker requirement and, in 
general, can be less expensive to achieve. This is the case 
when principals do not need to know the precise composi- 
tion of the currently active group but they need to be sure 
that the group is large enough to conduct a valid conference. 
(6) Cheating detection, well developed in secret sharing, 
can be used to detect principals who misbehave during the 
protocol execution. 
Clearly, secret sharing has also some characteristics which 
restrict its applicability for key establishment protocols. 
The two most serious are: first, the group who wish to call 
the conference must be known well ahead of the confer- 
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ence. The group can be composed by a trusted dealer or 
collectively by all participants. Secondly, shares have to be 
distributed to the principals via secure channels. Typically 
the groups involved in the conference are known well in 
advance and their memberships are fixed for some time so 
the first characteristics seems not to be a problem. More- 
over, secret sharing has, already developed methods and 
techniques to deal with modifications of the group (enrol- 
ment and disenrollment [ lo]). The second feature is 
unavoidable but can be dealt by conversion of secret 
sharing into the conditionally secure setting in which 
shares are communicated via less expensive broadcast 
channels. 
3 Trust infrastructure 
A key establishment protocol can be seen as a crypto- 
graphic tool which allows one to extend an initial trust 
which exists between principals A, B and their TTP to a 
trust between the two principals. Needless to say, the 
existence of trust is the necessary condition for any key 
establishment protocol to work correctly and to achieve the 
intended security goals. For instance, Needham and 
Schroeder [ 111 used a TTP who generated a fresh session 
key and transported it to principals via secure channels. In 
their key agreement protocol, Diffie et al. [3] assumed that 
any principal had the access to the other party’s authenti- 
cated public keys. The authenticated public keys were 
displayed by a TTP in the form of certificates signed by 
the TTP. Anyone who knew the corresponding (authentic) 
public key of the TTP, could verify certificates. 
There are three elements of trust infrastructure in secret 
sharing: the dealer, the combiner and secure channels. Now 
we discuss these components. 
3. I Dealer 
The role of dealer can be considered in the context of key 
transport and key agreement. In key transport, the dealer 
algorithm can be run by a TTP or a conference chair who 
composes the principals into a group who are eligible to 
call a conference. Next the chair determines a proper 
access structure which reflects the position of each princi- 
pal in the group and clearly identifies the smallest 
subgroups which are still eligible to call on the conference. 
Finally, the chair generates a fresh secret and divides it into 
shares which are secretly communicated to the principals. 
In key agreement, a TTP is a passive entity whose role is 
restricted to the delivery of authentic parameters of the 
principals (their public keys) on demand. The dealer must 
therefore be run collectively by principals or, in other 
words, every principal plays the role of dealer. Each 
principal sets up her own secret sharing for the group of 
her choice. Note that each principal has full control over 
the access structure of her secret sharing. The shares are 
next distributed secretly to the other principals. After all 
the principals have distributed their shares, each principal 
possesses her own share plus shares obtained from others. 
Finally, each principal combines all shares into one, hoping 
that the resulting secret sharing has an access structure 
which is acceptable to all. 
It is not difficult to notice that this approach can only 
work if all the principals use the same type of secret 
sharing which allows many instances of secret sharing 
generated locally to merge into one (without a central 
dealer). A broad class of secret sharing which allows one 
to do this is linear schemes. Even dealing with linear secret 
sharing does not solve the problem of different access 
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structures selected by individual principals. We know 
however, that if each principal selects a (t, n )  Shamir 
threshold scheme and distributes shares to the same collec- 
tion of principals, then the resulting scheme is also a 
threshold scheme. It is easy to check that if each principal 
selects a different threshold but the collection of principals 
is the same for all, then the threshold of the composed 
sharing is the largest used by principals (with an over- 
whelming probability). 
3.2 Combiner 
The role of the combiner in secret sharing is to collect 
shares from principals and if the currently active subset 
belongs to the access structure, then the combiner can 
recover the secret and communicate it to the principals via 
secure channels. 
In key establishment protocols, the role of the combiner 
needs to be redefined. Note that if we assume that the 
combiner is trusted then the principals do not need to send 
their shares as the combiner can generate a fresh key 
without interaction with the principals. The purpose of 
secret sharing is to recover the key while in key establish- 
ment protocols any fresh key is good. 
For key transport, there is a chair who designs a secret 
sharing of threshold 2 for a fresh secret. Each principal 
receives a single share while the chair holds the secret and 
one extra share. The extra share is used to trigger the 
conference by broadcasting it (broadcasting must be 
authenticated). Each principal, takes her share plus the 
one broadcast and recovers the secret key. Observe that 
each principal plays the role of combiner. 
Assume that there is no chair and the trusted dealer does 
not participate in conferences but sets up a secret sharing 
with a fresh key. If the secret sharing has the threshold 
n + I and the number of all shares is 3n (n is the number of 
all eligible principals) and each principal is assigned three 
shares, then to call on a conference, it is enough if n 
principals broadcast their shares. Knowing n shares, each 
principal can recover the secret key using her second share. 
The third share can be applied to verify the validity of the 
secret (or cheating detection). Clearly, a misbehaving 
principal can broadcast two or three shares instead of 
one. If a principal broadcasts two shares, she can recover 
the secret but cannot verify it. If she announces three 
shares, she cannot participate in the conference. 
Consider the role of combiner in the context of key 
agreement protocols. Assume that a (n + 1, 2n) secret 
sharing is set up collectively by all n principals so the 
threshold is (n + 1) and each principal holds two shares. To 
call a conference, it is enough for the principals to broad- 
cast their single shares. After the announcement of n 
shares, each principal can apply the second share to recover 
the secret (the threshold is (n  + 1)). 
The situation becomes more interesting if the call for a 
conference can be made by any t out of n principals. 
3.3 Communication channels 
Interaction among the principals is done via different 
communication channels. 
Confidentiality channels are very expensive to set up and 
use. Messages are encrypted before transmission so that 
any outsider who gains access to the channel is unable to 
understand them. Confidentiality channels can be imple- 
mented using symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. In 
the case of symmetric cryptography, both the sender and 
the receiver know the same cryptographic key. In asym- 
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metric (or public key) cryptography, the sender key is 
public but the receiver’s key is secret. Note that the 
sender must make sure that the key is the authentic 
public key of the intended receiver. 
Authenticity channels are typically less expensive as 
messages are communicated in plain and a relatively 
short authentication string is attached to them. Typically, 
the receiver can detect whether or not a message comes 
from the correct source and has not been tampered with 
during transmission. Authentication strings can be imple- 
mented using either digital signatures (every one can verify 
whether or not the signatures match the messages and their 
alleged sender), or message authentication code (MAC) 
where only the holders of the secrets which were used to 
produce the MAC can verify the validity of pairs: messages 
and their MACS. 
Broadcast channels are relatively cheap to implement. 
The sender may set up her publicly accessible billboard (a 
web page) on which she announces messages allowing the 
interested parties to fetch messages when they need them. 
Clearly, messages displayed on the billboard can be 
authenticated by appending signatures to them. 
A secure channel is one that provides both secrecy and 
authenticity. All interactions in key transport protocols are 
performed via secure channels implemented using either 
secret-key or public-key cryptosystems. This was the case 
for Needham-Schroeder protocols and their successors [ 13. 
Key agreement protocols are normally supported by 
public-key cryptosystems and broadcasting seems to be 
the predominant way of message communication [ 121. 
4 Security goals 
Security goals may vary but there is a relatively small 
collection of goals which are achievable in most confer- 
ence key establishment protocols. Additionally, it is desir- 
able that the protocol can be executed efficiently. The main 
collection of security goals for key establishment protocols 
are [12]: first, key freshness. The key has not been 
generated or used before in any other conference. Typi- 
cally, to ensure key freshness it is sufficient to generate the 
key at random from a large population so the probability of 
reusing some already generated keys, is negligible. 
Secondly, entity authentication, this is a confirmation 
process which allows one principal to correctly identify 
the others involved in the protocol. Typically, it allows a 
principal to check whether other principals are active 
(alive) at the time when the protocol is being executed. 
This requirement can be relaxed by defining group authen- 
tication in which every principal is sure that all the 
principals are alive and present. This allows any principal 
to identify the group rather than individuals. Weak group 
authentication means that all currently active principals are 
sure that there is a large enough group of active principals. 
In most circumstances, a conference is considered to be 
valid if a quorum of principals is present. The access 
structure (or the threshold parameter) conveniently deter- 
mines the size of a large enough group. Thirdly, key 
confirmation, this is a property of the protocol which 
allows one principal to make sure that the other parties 
possess the same common key. This is typically achieved 
by using the so-called handshaking or challenge-response 
interaction. The idea is to generate a random challenge, 
encrypt it using the key which needs to be confirmed and 
to expect from the other party the correct response, which 
is agreed before public transformation (say squaring the 
modulo of some prime). Forthly, implicit key authentica- 
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tion this provides an assurance to principals that no one 
except specific other parties could have gained access to 
the common key. Implicit key authentication can be also 
viewed as key confidentiality. Finally, explicit key authen- 
tication means that both implicit key authentication and 
key confirmation hold. 
In key agreement protocols, one would expect that the 
control over the final form of the key is distributed over the 
principals and there is no way that a subgroup of conspir- 
ing principals can force others to accept the key of their 
choice. This goal can be termed group key control. 
5 A new multiparty key agreement protocol 
The proposed key agreement applies secret sharing gener- 
ated independently by principals. Assume that there are n 
principals P I , .  . . , P,, who are eligible to participate in a 
conference. Each principal Pi; i = I ,  . . . , n, creates her own 
Shamir secret sharing defined by a polynomial f i ( z )  and 
distributes shares to the members of the group using pre- 
arranged secure channels. The combined secret sharing is 
defined by the polynomial 
n 
i= I 
Note that the secret F(0) generated collectively by the 
group is not known until the principals decide to pool their 
shares to recover the secret. Moreover, the principals 
contribute ‘equally’ to the fresh secret. The protocol 
progresses through three major phases: 
(1) Registration: each principal who wants to join the 
conference registers herself with a trusted registry 
(2) Initialisation: each principal creates her private secret 
sharing scheme and distributes shares to all other princi- 
pals 
(3) Call for conference: principals broadcast their shares 
and therefore enable themselves to recover a common 
secret key. 
5. I Assumptions 
Our assumptions are listed as follows: 
(i) there are n principals {Pl, . . . , P,,} who want to joint the 
conference, 
(ii) there exists a trusted registry (R) who manages the 
registration of principals. In particular, the registry keeps a 
list of public keys of principals, 
(iii) public information accessible from the registry is 
authenticated by the registry. Typically, information is 
accessible in a form of certificates signed by R, 
(iv) secure channels provide both secrecy and authentica- 
tion. Broadcast channels deliver authenticated messages to 
all principals (messages can be read by all but nobody can 
modify them without detecting the modification). 
Let p and q denote large p$mes such that q divides p - 1. 
Let G, be a subgroup of Z p  of order q and g be a generator 
of G,. 
5.2 Registration 
The principal Pi chooses her own private key xi E Z; and 
submits her public key hi = gxi (mod p )  for i = I ,  . . . , n to 
the registry R. When all the principals have completed 
their registration, the registry R displays a read-only list of 
public keys together with principals’ n%mes. Additionally, 
R generates a random integer r E R Z ,  on demand and 
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displays CI =g‘ for a short period of time. Normally, the 
value is generated whenever a need for conference arises 
(indicated by the principals who wish to call a conference). 
This value is erased after some time (when the conference 
has finished). The same value CI is never used in two 
different conferences. 
Registration serves three purposes. The first one is that 
each principal knows the other principals who are to join 
the conference. The second one is that the public keys can 
be used to implement secure channels between the princi- 
pals. For example, the information provided by the registry 
is enough to encrypt a messa$e using the ElGamal crypto- 
system. Assume that m E Z, and PI wants to send the 
message to Pj in e$crypted form. First, PI chooses a 
random integer v E Z, and computes g”, h; and m x h,”. 
The pair (g”, m x h,”) is sent to PI. The receiver P, takes the 
pair and computes (g”)”, =gvX~ which can later be used to 
extract the message m = m x h” x g-”J. The third purpose 
is to supply the principals with fresh (random) elements CI 
which are later used in the protocol. 
5.3 Initialisation 
This phase of the protocol is executed independently by 
each principal and proceeds as follows: 
(1) Pi designs a (n + 1, 2n) Shamir thresold scheme, i.e. a 
scheme with 2n shares and with threshold n + 1. Let the 
scheme be defined by a random polynomialfi(z) of degree 
at most n. Suppose that 
A(z) = aj.0 + a j p  + . . . + ai,,,? 
where coefficients ui , ,~Z,*  are chosen at random for 
j = l , .  . .,n. As usual in Shamir scheme, shares are 
computed for 2n public z coordinates. We assume that Pi 
is assigned a pair of coordinates zi = (2i - 1, 2i). 
(2) Next Pi prepares pairs of shares si, =f i (z i )  = (sj.’: = 
fl(Y - 11, 4;) =f,(W). 
(3) Finally, PI communicates sf2: to the principal P,; 
j =  1,. . . , n; j #  i via a secure channel. In effect, PI obtains 
a sequence of n elements (s‘~), . . . ,sf!) and computes her 
secret share Sf’ = x;=ls$l where SF) =F(2i) and the 
polynomial F(z) = :=lfl(z). 
Note that the secret s=F(O) = Cy=lu,,o is never exposed 
to principals. From now on s = F(0) will be called a seed to 
differentiate it from a fresh secret key obtained by all the 
principals involved in the conference. 
5.4 Call for a conference 
To start the conference, the principals execute the follow- 
ing steps: 
(1) Pi contacts the registry and fetches necessary para- 
meters including CI =$ (the registry selects r at random). If 
the element CI is not on display, Pi as$ R for one 
( 2 )  Pi prepares public shares pi,, = d 1 . j  for J = 1, . . . , n 
(3) Pi broadcasts /I i , ,  to all the principalsj = I , .  . . , n 
(4) After Pi has obtained /Ij., from other principals, she 
recovers n public shares 
for j = l ,  ..., n 
(5) PI uses n public shares and her secret share, S1(2) to 
recover the common secret S= = C I ~ .  Note that the 
principals still use the Lagrange interpolation but for 




b =  n - -  
j=2,4 ..., 2 n ; j f Z j  - 2i 
e n e - 2 j + 1  and b. = e=1,3, ..., 2n-1; t#2j-l 
are Lagrange coefficients 
(6) Pi takes the secret S, her name idi, and a and prepares a 
string CT~ = H(Sllidi 11.) where H is a cryptographically 
strong, collision resistant hash function with a public 
description. The triplet (o,, id,, a )  is broadcast (note that 
the broadcasting channel is assumed to provide authentica- 
tion). 
(7) Pi collects (oj, idj, a )  from other principals, checks 
their authenticity and verifies them using her own secret S. 
If the checks hold, Pi is ready for the conference. Other- 
wise, Pi announces the error and aborts the protocol. 
5.5 Security analysis 
The following theorem describes which security goals are 
achievable by the protocol. 
Theorem I :  Assume that the protocol is run by a group of 
honest principals, then the protocol attains the following 
security goals: (1) key freshness, (2) key confidentiality, 
(3) group authentication, (4) key confirmation. 
Pro08 (1) The*registry displays an integer a=$ for a 
random Note that the common secret key 
S=f = as is fresh as long as r is fresh. The freshness is 
probabilistic. 
(2) Key,, confidentiality holds as after broadcasting the 
shares as11, all outsiders know n public shares only. 
As the Shamir scheme is perfect, it means that n shares 
do not provide any information about the secret when the 
threshold is n + 1. The perfectness argument can only be 
used if the secret sharing is used once. For a multiple use, 
which is the case, the principals should be sure that the 
threshold of the group secret sharing is exactly (n  + 1). A 
simple way to decide whether the threshold is (n  + l), is to 
check if the secret derived according to the protocol by a 
principal is the same as the value obtained by the Lagrange 
interpolation of public shares only. If the two values are the 
same the threshold is not equal to (n  + 1). It is easy to 
verify that the probability of the threshold being (n + 
(1 - 4-1). 
(3) Group authentication (by contradiction). Assume 
that the protocol has been successful and the group 
authentication does not hold. From this assumption we 
will derive that instances of the discrete logarithm are easy 
to invert (which is the requested contradiction). From our 
assumptions we know that there is at least one principal, 
say P,, who has not participated in the protocol. As the 
threshold of the secret sharing is (n + l), somebody had to 
broadcast the prescribed collection of public shares 
bJ,, = a J J  ;i = 1, . . . , n, on behalf of P,. This can be done 
only if either the shares sj,'? can be extracted from the 
public shares announced in the previous runs or the 
random r can be extracted from CI = g". This leads us to 
the conclusion that the discrete logarithm instances used 
are easy, which is a contradiction. 
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(4) After the conference has been called, every principal 
can check whether other principals are holding the same 
secret by verifying the triplets (0, idJ, M )  for all j # i. The 
key confirmation is satisfied. This completes the proof. 
What if a subgroup of the principals does not follow the 
protocol? Let us consider the following possibilities: 
(1) At the initialisation stage, the subgroup can intention- 
ally lower the thresholds used in their private secret sharing 
schemes. This does not effect the work of the protocol as if 
at least one principal is honest, the threshold will be 
random and equal to (n+ 1) with the probability 
(1 - 4- ' ) .  The subgroup of conspirators can establish a 
conference but they compromise the confidentiality of their 
secret (see Theorem 2). 
(2) At the initialisation stage, the subgroup can intention- 
ally increase the threshold of their private schemes, then at 
the call for conference stage, the principals who are honest 
will recover inconsistent secrets and will abort the confer- 
ence (see Theorem 3). 
(3) At the call for conference stage, the subgroup can 
broadcast modified shares of their private schemes. This 
will be detected by honest principals when the secret is 
verified. 
(4) A disobedient principal Pi can make public her secret 
sharing scheme (the polynomialf,(z)). The conference can 
still be called but without involvement of PI. This is 
another way of saying call conference whenever you 
wish. P, can still participate in conferences if her share 
S? remains secret. If P, goes further and discloses Sy), 
then the secret key becomes public if the rest of the 
principals follows the protocol. Otherwise if some princi- 
pals refrain from broadcasting their public shares, the 
conference will not go ahead. 
Theorem 2. Given a group of n principals P,, . . . , P, who 
participate in the protocol. Assume that there is a subgroup 
P,, . . . , Pk of principals who lowered the threshold of their 
private secret sharing schemes so 
degJ;(z) = k 
for i = 1, , . . , k and k < n. Then the subgroup can work 
with their own secret sharing based on the polynomial 
i=1  
with the secret S' = aG('). This secret is known to the whole 
group P,, . . . , P,, and indeed to all outsiders. 
Prooj If all principals broadcast their public shares, then 
each principal can compute the secret S=aF(0) where 
F(z)= C~, l f l (z) .  A principal P,; i= 1 , .  . . ,n ,  can 
compute S' = aG(O) by simply ignoring all information 
obtained from participants not belonging the the subgroup, 
In particular, PI computes her secret share 
li 
and at the call for conference stage, calculates the follow- 
ing n public shares 
i = l  
As the secret sharing of the subgroup has the threshold 
( k  + l), the Lagrange interpolation gives the same secret 
S' = aG(') for any subset of k public shares. The subgroup 
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can agree on the secret which is known to the whole group. 
Moreover, an outsider can recover the secret S’ = aC(O) from 
any (k+ 1) public shares. The subgroup may have a 
conference which is public. 
Theorem 3 Given a group of n principals PI, .  . . , P,, who 
participate in the protocol. Assume that there is a dishonest 
principal P, who deviates from the protocol by selecting 
her random polynomialh(z) of degree (n  + 1). Then honest 
principals P,; i = 2, . . . , n detect this at the first run of the 
protocol during the key confirmation stage. 
Pro03 Without the loss of generality, we ignore exponen- 
tiation so, in other words, in the call for conference stage 
the principals broadcast their shares s!,: (instead of 
prescribed a’!::’). The proof is conducted by contradiction. 
Assume that there are two principals who recover the same 
secret. Let them be P, and P3. The secret sharing created 
by the group in the initialisation stage is defined by 
polynomial 
F(z) = C . r ; ( Z ) .  
i= 1 
As degf,(z) = n + 1, the degree of F(z) is also (n  + 1). P2 
applies the Lagrange interpolation for the following (n + 1) 
points: 
(4, SF’), (1, sy), . . . , (2n - 1, Si’’) 
where Sj”=F(2j  - 1) and Sf’=F(4) and finds a poly- 
nomial G2(z). Similarly, P3 knows 
(6, Sp’), (1, Si”), . . . , (2n - I ,  Si’)) 
where Sf) = F(6) and determines a unique polynomial 
G~(z)  which contains the points. Both G2(z) and G3(z) 
are of degree at most n. If both P2 and P, recover the same 
secret, it means that G2(0) = G3(0). As the polynomials 
G2(z) and G3(z) contains (n + 1) common points ((1, 
Sl”), . . . ,(2n - 1, Si’)) and (0, G2(0))), they have to be 
identical so G2(z)=G3(z). On the other hand, knowing 
( n  + 2) points 
one could find F(z) using the Lagrange interpolation. Note 
that these points also belong to G2(z) so F(z) = G2(z). This 
implies that deg F(z) = n which is our requested contra- 
diction. This completes the proof. 
We claim that the protocol can be used repeatedly to call 
conferences as the seed s remains secret and to recover the 
fresh secret key S, the principals need to use secret sharing 
to compute it. 
Recall that the discrete logarithm (DL) problem is 
defined as follows. Given the modulus N, the element g 
and h = g“ modN. What is x. ? 
Assume that the principals have been running the 
protocol l times. We define a view Vi(l) of principal Pi 
which specifies the information available to P, after e 
successful executions of the protocol. It is easy to verify 
that 
~ ( l )  =~r;(z>, ~ i ( 2 )  -+ (setup stage) 
Si” 
a,, a, , . . . ,a$”. a.; + (first run) 
SO) 
a,, ai , . . . , a$), ai -+ (lth run) 
+ public information) 
where a l  , . . . , a, are random values generated by R. Note 
that the strings oi, generated for key confirmation purpose, 
are omitted from the view. The reason is that the assump- 
tion that the hash function is cryptographically strong is 
not enough to draw any conclusions about the overall 
security of the protocol. It is expected that hash function 
must not share any homomorphic property with exponen- 
tiation [12]. 
Theorem 4. Given the protocol without key confirmation. If 
the principals honestly follow the protocol and run it 
successfully l times and the applied discrete logarithm 
instances are intractable, then the seed s remains unknown 
to principals (and outsiders). 
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the seed 
can be obtained from a view Y.(l)  using a polynomial-time 
probabilistic algorithm A which takes the view as an input 
and returns the seed, or A(Vi(l)) =s. Consider an intract- 
able instance of the DL problem defined by the pair (h, g )  
such that h =e. For this instance, we create a view V&). 
To do this, we need to design a secret sharing for g“. We 
select at random integer U,,,, E~Z:  and and 
6, =gun,. . . = g u n - l .  Points (l,guI), (3, 
gu2). . .(2n - 3, gu*i-l) together with (0, f) and (2, 
gun-!) uniquely determine the point (2n - 1, gun) using 
the Lagrange interpolation for exponents. The view gener- 
ated for the DL instance has the following form: 
a, = g‘l, ay,. .. , a?, 4 = h‘’ -+ (first run) 
at = g Q ,  a, U,  , . . . , a?, = h‘e -+ (lth run) 
+ public information) 
where f’(z), and (a1 , . . . , a!) are random elements gener- 
ated according to the protocol specification. We argue that 
views y ( l )  and VDL(l)  are statistically indistinguishable 
[ 131. This is true as all elements are selected randomly and 
uniformly. Now we can input the view V,,(l) into the 
algorithm A .  If the algorithm works for the view K(e), it 
must also work for the view VDL(l)  as both views are 
statistically indistinguishable. This means that A retums x 
and solve the intractable instance of the DL problem. This 
is requested contradiction which proves the claim. This 
completes the proof. 
Consider the efficiency of the protocol. The first part in 
which the principals design their private secret sharing 
schemes is not computationally intensive. The reconstruc- 
tion of the secret key S and the key verification constitute 
the main computational overhead. To reconstruct the secret 
key, the principals have to first compute their public shares 
and later use the Lagrange interpolation to recover the 
polynomial aF@) and the secret S = aF(O). 
The communication overhead for the protocol consists 
of two components. The first one involves confidential 
delivery of the shares sf:) from any single principal to the 
others. This consumes (n - 1) confidential transmissions 
for every principal. The second component consists of 
broadcasting shares P I ,  = CI’~.J. This takes n broadcast 
transmissions for all principals. Table 1 summarises the 
communication and computation overhead for the proto- 
col. 
Our protocol compares favourably with other key agree- 
ment protocols. For example, the protocols by Burmester 
and Desmedt [6] are designed with a specific network 
configuration in mind. The most evident weakness of 
0 )  
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Table 1: Communication and computation requirements for the main protocol 
Communication 
(message sent by 
each principal) 
Computation 




Call for conference 
preparation 
distribution 
1 message sent to 
registry 
n messages sent to 
other principals 
via secure channel 
share broadcasts n broadcasts 
key calculation 
key confirmation 1 message broadcasts 
1 exponentiation 
x 2 n 2  multiplications and 




(n+  1) exponentiations 
(Lagrange interpolation) 
Hashing of a single message 
and 1 exponentiation 
for authentication 
their protocols seems to be the lack of principal authenti- 
cation. Just and Vaudenay [7] incorporated the authentica- 
tion of principals into the Burmester-Desmedt protocols 
but the authentication can be achieved with the neighbour- 
ing principals only. 
6 A (t, n) Multiparty key agreement 
In general, conferences do not need the whole group to be 
active. Assume that out of n members of the group, t are 
allowed to call on the conference (t  < n). The straightfor- 
ward application of the previous protocol will not work. 
Note that after the principals collectively set up the ( t  + 1, 
2n) secret sharing, any group of active principals larger 
than t will compromise the confidentiality of the agreed 
key. One could solve this problem by requesting the 
principals who are about to broadcast their public shares 
to first contact the registry and ask it for permission. In this 
case, the registry keeps account of who has already 
contacted it and obtained permission. Some other possibi- 
lities are: to introduce an additional phase in which 
participants announces the intention of broadcasting a 
public shares by showing a random number. After the 
phase lapses, the principals order the numbers. Only the t 
top ones are allowed to participate in the share broad- 
casting. Another possibility is to broadcast public shares in 
encrypted form. Later active principals order their 
encrypted shares and only the t top principals broadcast 
the corresponding decryption keys. This can be an attrac- 
tive option as encryption can be based on a fast block 
ciphet such as the DES algorithm. 
The solution we present here is a modification of the 
main protocol which preserve the overall structure and 
more importantly, security evaluation obtained for the main 
protocol is also valid here. The registration phase is as 
before. In the initialisation phase, all the principals have to 
be active and each principal Pi designs her own (t+ I ,  
t + 1) Shamir secret sharing defined by the polynomialf,(z) 
and computes (t + 1) shares s,,, =f,(j) where j = 1, . . . , 
t + 1. She prepares y1 auxillary shares E ~ ,  such that 
where X is public (n x t)  matrix whose any collection of t 
rows constitutes a nonsingular matrix. She also distributes 
auxiliary shares to her fellow principals so Pi obtains 
for j = 1, . . . , n; j # i via secure channels and additionally 
si,,+] is communicated securely to all other principals. She 
composes the auxiliary shares into a single auxiliary share 
E i  = E i ,  j 
j= 1 
and merges shares so 
this share is common for all principals. 
secret sharing with the underlying polynomial 
The principals collectively set up a (t + 1, t + 1) Shamir 
i= 1 
Denote shares Si=F(i). Any collection of t or more 
different auxiliary shares allows a principal to recover the 
shares (SI, . . . , S,). Again S,+] is known to all principals. 
To trigger the conference, there must be at least t active 
principals. Without the loss of generality, assume that the 
active set A= { P I , .  . . , P t }  and each Pi E A performs the 
following steps: 
(1) Contacts the registry and fetches necessary parameters 
including a =g (the registry selects r at random). If the 
element a is not on display, Pi asks R for one 
(2)  Prepares public share pi = aEc and broadcasts it 
( 3 )  Computes first shares (aS1, . . . , as,) using Lagrange 
interpolation (this step is identical to that used to recover 
the secret for Shamir scheme, note that the computations 
are done on exponents) and later calculates a common key 
S = aF(0) using the complete set of shares (aS,, . . . , aS,+1) 
(4) Pi takes the secret S, her name idi, and a and prepares a 
string 0, =H(Sllid,lla) where H is a cryptographically 
strong, collision resistant hash function with a public 
description. The tr iplet (q i ,  id,, a )  is broadcast (note that 
the broadcasting channel is assumed to provide authentica- 
tion). 
(5) Pi collects (oi , id,, a) from the other principals, checks 
their authenticity and verifies them using her own secret S. 
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If the checks hold, Pi is ready for the conference. Other- 
wise, Pi announces the error and aborts the protocol. 
The protocol achieves the same security goals as the main 
protocol. If a run of the protocol is successful, all currently 
active principals know that there are at least t of them in the 
group and the last steps allow them to identify them. 
The modified protocol has the following remarkable 
properties. 
(1) A principal who does not belong to A, can always join 
the conference later by using the public shares and key 
confirmation strings 
(2) A principal not in A can attend the conference 
passively, i.e. collect all public information which allows 
her to obtain the secret key. Later she can read all the 
information exchanged during the conference without 
others knowing that she is present 
( 3 )  It is possible to add a new principal to the conference 
(enrollment). It is sufficient for a newcomer to design her 
private secret sharing and distribute her shares to other 
members and other members give her their shares. 
7 Conclusions 
Principals involved in the protocols generate their own 
secret sharing schemes and use secure channels to distri- 
bute shares among themselves. In effect, they jointly create 
the group secret sharing. For a single run, principals use 
broadcasting to announce their public shares and use secret 
shares to compute the secret key. Note that the (n  + 1, 2n) 
secret sharing used in the first protocol can be replaced by 
(n  + 1, n + 1) secret sharing. In this case, each principal 
has two shares and one of them is common for all 
principals. 
Note that the second version of the protocol which can 
be run by any t out on n principals, uses a variant of secret 
sharing in which any t active principals are able to 
reconstruct t public shares (and recover the key using the 
common secret share). 
Assume that a group of principals already collectively 
holds a secret via a (t, n )  secret sharing. Is it possible to 
design a protocol which enables the group to agree on a 
key? The answer seems to be in the affirmative. Consider a 
possible solution based on the concept of divisible shares 
[14]. The principals take their shares and ‘divide’ them into 
two parts: one will be used to produce public shares (using 
exponentiation) and the second is used to compute the 
common key. The effective threshold would in general, be, 
much higher than t. If the principals decide collectively to 
split their shares in two, then the effective threshold would 
be 2t - 1 as if 2t - 1 principals pool their share halves 
together, they will know (t - 1/2) public shares. This 
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